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Income Policies and International 
Expérience: Further Commente 
Adolf Sturmthal 
It remains that the main problem of an incomes policy 
as a mean of restraining inflation in a full employment 
economy is that of the long run. It is, I believe, fait to 
point out that this problem has hardly been tackled so far 
and that the tendency to look at incomes policy in the light 
of temporary emergencies has blocked rather than opened 
the road to a solution. 
Introduction 
The récent dévaluation of the pound Sterling has put increased 
emphasis on the problems created by the famous uneasy triangle des-
cribed by the London Economist in 1952 of full employment, price 
stability, and free collective bargaining. In an earlier paper, I hâve 
attempted to présent a first and tentative évaluation of the European 
expérience in that gênerai area. Without much satisfaction, indeed 
with a good deal of regret, I hâve to point out that events since that 
earlier paper was written hâve confirmed my pessimistic conclusion. 
Incomes policy is not a main pillar of an anti-inflationary policy. At 
the best it is a temporary and subsidiary device. In most cases, even 
within thèse limis, it cannot be expected to produce totally or even 
highly satisfactory results. 
The Concept of "Cost-Push" 
The concept of cost or supply 
inflation (« cost-push » as dis-
tinguished from « demand-pull ») 
has a long histpry. As Bron-
fenbrenner and Holzman, in their 
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« Survey of Inflation Theory » \ point out, « cost-inflation reasoning 
underlay, for example, the varions Statutes of Laborers which 
followed the médiéval Black Death. » Spécial référence to wage-
inflation as a concomitant of full employment was made in the 
Beveridge Report which, in effect, anticipating the London Economist, 
suggested eompulsory arbitration, thus eliminating free collective bar-
gaining from the ill-fated triangle. Since then, the literature on cost-
push as distinguished from demand-pull inflation or combined with it 
has become so voluminous that the Bronfenbrenner-Holzman survey 
just quoted contains a bibliography of no less than 183 items up to about 
]963 — including, it is true, thanks to the linguistic versatility of one of 
the authors, items in French and Japanese. Considérable intellectual 
impetus was given to the cost-push theory by the celebrated study of 
À. W. Phillips on « The Relation between Unemployment and the Rate 
of Change of Money Wage Rates in the United Kingdom, 1862-1957 » 2 
and the lengthy discussion following this article. The practical moti-
vation for a good deal of the work was provided partly by the long-term 
inflationary trend in the Western world following World War II, but 
even more by the séries of balance-of-payments crises which dot the 
économie landscape during the period of growth and super-growth in 
the last two décades.8 
The Différences in Objectives 
There is no reason to doubt that inflationary developments can be 
set off by events on the supply side as well as those on the demand side. 
What may be questioned is whether the prevailing cost-push théories 
hâve produced more than a list of a set of conditions without which 
cost-push inflation would be impossible rather than an intelleotually 
satisfactory explanation of the force or forces that unleash that process 
( 1 ) In Surveys of Economie Theory — Money, Interest, and Welfare ( New York : 
St. Martin's Press, 1965), p. 64. 
(2) Economica, November 1958, pp. 283-99. 
(3) There has been from time to time mutual incompatibility between full 
employment and an adéquate balance of payments, in the sensé that balance of 
payments difficulties hâve prevented the achievement or maintenance of full or 
over-full employment. Contrary to what Professor Hicks (J.R. HICKS : « Economie 
Foundations of Wage Policy », Economie Journal, LXV, September 1955, p. 391) 
said, the world is not on a labor standard, but rather on some kind of export-price 
standard, modified by international capital movements. 
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on the supply side and détermine its scope and duration. This, however, 
is a large topic by itself and we shall leave it at this point.4 
Questions of this kind as well as a certain lack of clarity about the 
purposes of an incomes policy make for some difficulty in evaluating 
the results of the latter. Clearly, différent évaluations might be obtained 
according to whether the objective is, for instance, 
a) price stability (in terms of some index of wholesale, or retail 
priées or cost-of-living) ; or 
b) price competitiveness of exported goods and services; or 
c) a balance of payments equilibrium defined in some way. 
In practice the objectives are frequently mixed. Thus the United 
States experiment with wage-price guideposts was stated in terms of 
objective (a), but also of (b) and (c) , and sometimes objective (a) 
was described as a condition for meeting objectives (b) and (c). The 
well-known French report on Incomes Policy5 points out that recessions 
in postwar France were the resuit « not of spontaneous fluctuations in 
the demand, but rather of the obligation of public authorities to restrict 
crédit and budget expenditures in order to counteract the external 
déficit, which itself followed from an excessively rapid rise of domestic 
priées. » However, shortly after this, the Report refers to the stabiliza-
tion plan of September 12, 1963, which arose without balance of 
payments crisis, while France possessed large reserves of foreign exchan-
ge, with the primary objective of prevenring an excessively rapid rise of 
domestic priées. The objectives of incomes policy may thus not only 
differ from country to country, but also from time to time. 
There is, of course, a fairly close interrelationship among thèse 
objectives and between them and another major objective of économie 
policy — that of économie growth. A detailed analysis lies beyond 
(4) E.g., the statistical évidence suggesting significant relationships between 
wage increases and profit margins for the United States — but not for the United 
Kingdom — does not « explain » in any sensé why wage increases must lead to 
price increases rather than a réduction of profits. Nor do they « explain » the 
conditions giving rise to the large profits so that the hypothesis cannot be rejected 
that it is the latter rather than the wage increases which set in motion the 
inflationary process. 
(5) € Rapport sur la politique des revenus établi à la suite de la Conférence des 
revenus » (octobre 1963 - janvier 1964), présenté par M. Pierre Massé, February 13, 
1964, La Documentation Française, 1964, p. 5. 
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the purpose of this paper, but it deserves pointing out that in most cases 
trade-offs at the margin between compétitive objectives may be involved. 
Thus some trade-off may be made between économie growth and price 
stability, price stability and industrial unrest, or économie growth and 
external déficits so that considérations of domestic politics, foreign 
policy and the stability of exchange rates enter the picture. Domestic 
politics may détermine the maximum acceptable rate of unemployment, 
of inflation and of social conflict; foreign policy the maximum rate of 
curtailment (or the minimum rate of expansion) of foreign commitments, 
as well as permissible rates of currency dévaluation, etc. 
Thus, it would appear that this country is particularly sensitive to 
inflation and somewhat less sensitive than most countries in -Western 
Europe to unemployment. Industrial conflict is accepted more freely 
in this country than, perhaps in Germany, and so on. Empirically, this 
is difficult to détermine without getting into some degree of circular 
reasoning: we might read tolérance of inflation into data on relative 
inflation and then explain inflation out of tolérance for it, etc. For an 
anthropologist or political scientist, cross-cultural comparisons in this 
field might be of considérable interest. 
Another distinction among incomes policies may be made according 
to the scope of thèse policies — i.e., whether they aim at influencing 
wages alone or other incomes as well (directly or, more frequently, 
indirectly by way of influence on priées or price changes). 
Thirdly, incomes policies may be pursued by a variety of methods 
which in turn may be classified in différent ways. One such classifi-
cation may be based upon the degree of coercion involved ranging from 
what the Germans call « soûl massage » to strict enforcement by controls 
and courts. 
Further distinctions could be made according to the degree of 
involvement of unions and employers associations in the process, the 
relationship between incomes policies and other économie policies, etc. 
In the absence of clearly stated objectives and given their interrela-
tionship, I hâve attempted to evaluate the policies pursued in différent 
countries in terms of a single criterion — changes in labor costs. Other 
criteria — e.g., stability of the price level however defined or especially 
stable weighted price averages of domestically produced goods and 
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services — are of course equally applicable or, from some points of 
view, even more meaningful. Unit labor costs, however, are significant 
for many purposes and are statistically reasonably well defined and 
available. 
The Evaluation of Incomes Policies 
The data for the évaluation of various incomes policies hâve been 
presented in a previous paper. Briefly summarized, they are as follows: 
TABLE 1 
AVERAGE ANNUAL CHANGES ( I N PER CENTS) OF LABOR COSTS (EARNINGS) 
PER U N I T O F OUTPUT IN MANUFACTURING 
1952-58 1948-65 1952-58 1948-65 
Austria 0.7 2.7 Netherlands 3.2 3.0 
Belgium 
— 
0.4 Norway 1.4 1.4 
Denmark 2.0 3.9 Sweden 2.0 2.0 
France 4.5 3.2 Switzerland __ 2.0 
West Germany 1.8 3.2 United Kingdom 3.6 2.3 
Ireland 1.9 2.3 United States 1.2. — 0.8 
Italy — 1.8 2.6 
Source : C.T. Saunders, ECE, « Macro-Economie Aspects of Incomes Policy ». 
Paper presented in October 1966 at a Symposium on the Labor Market 
and Inflation, organized by the International Institute for Labor Studies, 
Geneva. The papers and proceedings of this Symposium are to be 
published in book form. 
Of the 13 countries listed, five — Austria, Denmark, Netherlands, 
Norway, Sweden — are countries with incomes policies; eight — Bel-
gium, France, West Germany, Ireland, Italy, Switzerland, the United 
Kingdom and the United States — are classified as countries without an 
incomes policy during ail or most of the two periods considered (1952-58; 
1958-65). There may be some argument about some of the classifica-
tions. Thus the Scandinavian countries hâve practiced, most of the 
time, an incomes policy administered by the partners to collective 
bargaining based upon their highly centralized bargaining Systems. I 
hâve included them in the list of countries with income policies even 
though the government plays only a subsidiary rôle in income détermi-
nation. The United States and the United Kingdom, for part of the 
second period had their guideposts and the National Board for Priées 
and Incomes — the United States since 1962, the United Kingdom 
effectively since 1965. I hâve included both among the countries 
without policy, taking into account the greater part of the period under 
considération. 
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Some conclusions that are suggested by thèse data are: 
a) The effectiveness of incomes policies seems to hâve diminished 
over time, but this may be due to increasing inflationaxy pres-
sures rather than the progressive décline in the impact of the 
policy on earnings. 
b) Restraint lias worked best at the highest levels of employers' 
and workers' organizations and seems to hâve lost some of its 
effectiveness along the way from the bargaining table to the 
workshop. Hence the phenomenon of wage drift, the discre-
pancy between contract and effective rates. 
c) The extent to which wage drift has defeated incomes policy 
is somewhat dubious. There seems to be some, though not 
very close, relationship between wage drift and inflationary 
pressure — not enough to make restraint on negotiated wage 
increases completely irrelevant, but sufficient to reduce the 
effectiveness of incomes policy to situations with a high rate 
of increase of labor costs (approximately 2.5 per cent per 
annum). 
d) The évidence does not indicate that countries with incomes 
policies hâve done any better than those without. However, 
the number of cases is so small, the diversity of situations so 
tremendous (e.g., impact of foreign trade, différences in col-
lective bargaining Systems, currency dévaluations), the limi-
tation of the data to manufacturing, so important a qualifi-
cation that one hésitâtes to draw farreaching conclusions. 
Perhaps ail that can prudently be said is that the case for the 
effectiveness of incomes policies has not been proven. 
e) It should be understood that this conclusion holds even if the 
criterion of success or failure is not set at perfect équivalence 
between the rate of increase of effective incomes and the target 
rate. For the data indicate that countries with (formai or 
informai) incomes policies do not fare any better than those 
without. The limitations on this conclusion are the same as 
those just mentioned. 
The Implications 
Perhaps more interesting are some of the implications of incomes 
policies and the discussions accompanying the introduction of such 
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policies. Many incomes policies hâve used productivity in some ways 
as the main yardstick in the détermination of permissible wage in-
creases. 6 Assuming that ail divergencies about the measurement of 
productivity changes can be settled, the alternative implications of the 
use of such a yardstick are of considérable significance. 
(a) One alternative is the « économie concertée », or « consensus », 
an agreement on the maintenance of the existing income shares.T Such 
an agreement is unlikely to be forthcoming, certainly not for the long 
run. It is conceivable, indeed likely, that a temporary agreement of 
this kind could be concluded, say — for the duration of a national 
emergency, such as a war or an overwhelming natural disaster. Nothing, 
however, justifies the expectation that such an agreement would be 
eternal or even long-lasting.8 
Sometimes, acceptance of an incomes policy is suggested in the 
light of the considération that money wage increases going beyond 
productivity increases are self-defeating. This is surely incorrect where 
« compétitive sectional bargaining » prevails and — as a resuit of various 
lags — may be incorrect even for highly centralized national wage 
bargains. If it were true or if it were accepted as truth or if the assump-
tions underlying the « économie concertée » were to be imposed upon 
the collective bargaining System, then the alternative (b) would arise. 
(b) If collective bargaining cannot be used as an instrument for 
a change in the distribution of the national income, then it is more îikely 
that labor would be induced to employ other methods for the purpose. 
( 6 ) In other cases — e.g., Sweden and the Netherlands — estimâtes of c allow-
able » wage increases hâve been based upon forecasts of output changes during the 
coming year. The United Kingdom shifted from a long-term productivity trend to 
a projected figure based on forecasts of the National Economie Development 
Council. 
(7) The absence of such an agreement in the United States where the guide-
posts were discussed neither in Congress nor with labor and management, did not 
présent too much of a problem at first, particularly in early years of Président 
Johnson's term of office. Later, this proved to be one of the décisive weaknesses 
of the policy. 
(8) Pierre Massé, former Commissaire au Plan, has expressed the somewhat 
surprising hope that the joint efforts of neutral experts and représentatives of 
interest groups within the Study Center of Incomes and Costs (CERC) set up in 
April 1966 would produce some from of « social contract » embodying a « conscience 
concerning the future ». It is too early to judge the results of the work of CERC. 
In the case of Britain, a temporary and reluctant consensus seems to hâve been re-
established as a resuit of the dévaluation of the pound Sterling, but this, too, is an 
early and uncertain impression. 
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Among thèse, political action would be the most likely candidate. 
Stymied in its attempt to use the bargaining process for one of its main 
objectives, labor would shift a good deal of its effort into the arena of 
politics: This may be good or bad, according to one's prédilections. 
What matters is simply to recognize the implications of what one is 
doing. Incomes policy in gênerai would most often tend to ernphasize 
the political concerns of labor. An incomes policy based upon an 
unchanging distribution of the national income would undoubtedly re-
enforce that trend. 
This évolution would become even more likely if a given incomes 
policy were unable or unwilling to prevent other changes in income 
distribution while holding labor's share constant. Thus a transfer into 
corporate profits from — say — returns on smaller enterprises would 
make an incomes policy morally hard to défend and would invite shifts 
into the political arena if the collective bargaining process cannot be 
used as an instrument of change in the distribution.9 
Some Deeper Issues 
This considération leads one into an examination of still deeper 
lying issues. Incomes policies, in their current fashion, were designed 
to deal primarily with one of the basic problems of a full employment 
society, namely its built-in inflationary trend. The question may be 
asked whether the policies that hâve been proposed are designed to deal 
with a long-term situation or with temporary emergencies. In the latter 
sensé, experiments hâve been made in various situations: in Great Britain, 
the 1948-51 attempt to restrain wage increases, the 1939-47 wage policy 
understanding; counterparts can be found in the United States, in 
Sweden, and elsewhere. Ail thèse had in common their intentional 
transitional character. As such they were fairly successful devices for 
slowing down processes.10 In most cases, the effectiveness of the 
restraint tended to diminish as time went on, and the termination of 
(9) As against this, the argument can be advanced that labor's share has been 
constant under free collective bargaining. This may be so, but politically, there is a 
world of différence between the resuit of the opérations of the market and a formai 
acceptance of the status quo. Needless to say, stability of labor's share does not 
mean stable share for every single group or for organized labor as a whole. 
( 10 ) See Clark Kerr's paper on « Governmental Wage Restreints : Their Limits 
and Uses in a Mobilized Economy », American Economie Review, Vol. XLII, No. 2, 
May 1952. Kerr discusses the relative effectiveness of restraints under various 
assumptions about the degree of urgency of the emergency. 
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the experiment usually occurred in fact before it was officially aban-
doned. 
This view of incomes policies seems to hâve been lost. With full 
employment in most Western countries a permanent and highest priority 
objective of économie policy and an almost uninterrupted fact for a 
décade and a half in Western Europe, the notion that incomes policies 
are temporary emergency measures appears to hâve given way to a new 
approach. This regards both full employment and incomes policies 
designed to restrain inflationary cost developments as permanent features 
of a modem économie landscape. An intermedîate approach views both 
full employment and inflationary pressure as long-term, but intermittent 
phenomena: inflationary full employment periods interrupted from time 
to time by « lapses » from full employment accompanied by déclines in 
earnings, stable wage rates, and relative price stability. Given the 
downward inertness of wage rates and the relatively greater difficulty 
of obtaining price decreases (as against the prévention of price increases), 
this last view would merely hold out the hope of a lesser rate of inflation 
paid for by higher average levels of unemployment over time — a kind 
of hiccupping-inflation accompanied by hiccupping unemployment. 
It thus remains that the main problem of an incomes policy as a 
means of restraining inflation in a full employment economy is that of 
the long run. It is, I believe, fair to point out that this problem has 
hardly been tackled so far and that the tendency to look at incomes 
policy in the light of temporary emergencies has blocked rather than 
opened the road to a solution. Let me elaborate on this. 
(a) In the area of price and wage restraint, the divorce of ideology 
from action has been most obvious. I cannot do better than quote John 
Kenneth Galbraith, even though my own conclusions as to how to 
proceed, differ considerably from his. He says: 
On occasions of public ceremony, businessmen and numerous union 
leaders must still proclaim their commitment to the free market. And 
likewise economists. It is hard to turn from thèse liturgical exercises 
to a considération of practical measures for insuring that the guide-
posts will be observed. In the thirties, although the commitment of 
economists to the canons of sound finance was still strong, a minority 
accepted the implications of the Keynesian system and proceeded to 
work out its application to practical fiscal policy. Though radical this 
was not wholly disreputable. To work on methods of wage and price 
controï is not reputable. Only after a scholar is in public office is the 
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ban lifted. And then he is careful to speak not of control but (as 
frequently hère) of restraint. The amenability of the corporations and 
unions to control — ideology to the contrary — means that it need 
not be very strong. But it is hard to take purely hortatory enforee-
ment very seriously, X1 
And in a final blow, he quotes Paul Samuelson: 
« Thèse guideposts... do not hâve the force of law ; the scowls by 
the Président... cannot solve the dilemmas of full employnient and 
price stability. » 12 
(b) Incomes policies represent a return, concealed as it may be, 
to the methods of the « dirigisme > of the Thirties. Instead of con-
tinuing along the lines of the more sophisticated approach — changes 
in the demand and supply schedules — we are returning to attempts 
to control directly the outcome of the market. This, I submit, is a loss, 
not only in sophistication, but also in effectiveness. 
(c) We do not know very much about the long-run impact of 
incomes policies on productivity. In our concern with the reverse rela-
tionship, we hâve neglected — again as a long-run proposition — the 
influence that incomes policies may hâve upon the allocation of labor, 
its training, etc. The conflict that may exist between the requirements 
— in terms of wage structure and avoidance of industrial conflict — of 
rapid économie growth and of price stability, has harclly been 
examined.1S 
In particular, we hâve hardly begun to examine the possible impact 
of incomes policies on the allocation of resources in the long run. This 
involves two différent sets of questions: the substitution of capital for 
labor and the substitution of one type of labor for another. 
To begin with the latter, it has become fashionable to point out that 
changes in wage differentials are not necessary to allocate différent kinds 
(11) JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, The New Industrial State (Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin, 1967), p. 258. 
(12) PAUL A. SAMUELSON, Economies, Sixth Edition (New York : McGraw, 1964), 
p. 792. 
( 13 ) « It is hazardous to make a medium-term appraisal of the 19661-67 freeze, 
because if the demand restrictions affect the long term productivity growth rate, 
there could be a serious offset to any gain from a more moderate growth in 
incomes. » John G. Corina's « Can an Incomes Policy Be Administered ? » Paper 
prepared for the Third World Congress, IRRA, September 1967. See also W.R.C. 
Keeler, « The Relationship of Plant Productivity Agreements to Incomes Policy », 
British Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. V, No. 1, March 1967. 
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of labor.14 However, whether this conclusion holds for every occupa-
tional group is an open question event assuming that it holds in the 
aggregate. In order to be true for ail occupational groups (and in 
every labor market taken separately) ail supply and demand elasticities 
of occupational groups would hâve to be of the same gênerai shape — a 
somewhat unlikely proposition. 
The indifférence toward labor supply elasticity in the OECD study 
contrasts sharply with the exactly opposite view advanced by Kindle-
berger.15 According to him, the great secret of the long European boom 
has been the unusually high elasticity of labor supply in Western Europe. 
Once again, I would prefer to speak of the supply elasticity of particular 
occupational groups; in this case, the key may hâve been in the high 
elasticity of the supply of common labor, the increase in demand for 
higher skills and the ability of formerly unskilled workers to move up 
into better-paying jobs for which they represented a highly elastic 
supply.16 Thus the immigration of common labor made for high supply 
elasticities for both low-paying and medium-paying jobs. To generalize 
this situation is, however, inadmissible in terms of both time and place. 
As to the substitution of capital for labor, attempts to hold wages 
down would affect substitution rates only if the simultaneous attempt 
to hold down priées were unsuccessful or less successful.17 
Conclusions 
Still more fundamental, it seems to me, is the fact that we hâve 
regarded a Iong-term full employment society simply as our traditional 
society minus substantial long-term unemployment. Only gradually 
(14) See in particular the OECD study of wages and labor mobility. It is, however, 
possible to interpret the data presented in that study as suggesting the opposite 
conclusion. 
15 CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER, Europe S Postwar Growth (Cambridge, Mass. : 
Harvard University Press, 1967). This view finds support in Angus Maddison's 
study of Western Europe. 
(16) In the European case, where manufacturing employment is still expanding, 
the « relative wage signal », to use Bob Raimon's expression, was pointing in the 
right direction. 
(17) A successful price policy, however, might, if productivity is used as a 
guidepost, require price decreases. In that case, marginal substitution rates might be 
changed, not by économie rationality, but by the relative degrees of effectiveness 
of incomes policies. The économie structure would adjust to the latter and post hoc 
« justify » the politically determined solution. 
232 INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, VOL. 23, No. 2 
are we becoming aware of the fact that the absence of substantial long-
term employment may affect the character of some of our basic insti-
tutions. 
Since the work of A. W. Phillips 18 we are ail aware of the close 
though perhaps kinked connection between the level of unemployment 
and the rate of change of money wage rates. The search for a critical 
level of unemployment at which inflationary wage developments could 
be held within acceptable limits has been extensive though its results 
hâve been uncertain. A part of the reason for this uncertainty lies in 
the lack of a clear distinction between short-run and long-run. Levels 
of unemployment or rates of wage-cost inflation that may be acceptable 
in the short run may be intolérable as long-run phenomena and vice-
versa. 
More important still : Unions and businesses might be prepared 
to accept restraints on their wage and price policies for short-run 
emergencies which might be intolérable for them in the long run. They 
might be able to carry out a policy of restraint for a given pe;riod, but 
might find it impossible for an indefinite length of time. Indeed, it is 
difficult to see how unions and businesses could operate over the long 
run without a profound change in their character if the restraints of 
an incomes policy were to be imposed upon them permanently. It is 
quite possible that unions could continue to exist within such a frame-
work, but they would hardly be unions of the kind that now exists. 
Undoubtedly, private enterprise could in some ways adapt to the requi-
rements of an incomes policy, but it would in the process change its 
character radically. 
Admittedly, there is nothing sacred about either institution and it 
is fairly obvious that even in the absence of an incomes policy unions 
and businesses are being changed radically by the existence of long-term 
full employment. There may be good reasons for willing acceptanee of 
the further and still more radical transformation which an incomes policy 
would impose — with varying degrees of harshness — upon both unions 
and businesses. What I question is whether such changes should be 
18 A.W. PHILLIPS : « The Relation between Unemployment and the Rate of 
Change of Money Wage Rates in the United Kingdom, 1852-1957 », Economica, 
XXV, November 1958. This has been followed by a prolonged discussion. A survey 
of the latter is presented in George L. Perry : Unemployment, Money Wage 
Rates, and Inflation (Cambridge, Mass. : M.I.T. Press, 1966). 
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made — as it were — incidentally, as by-products of policies designed 
to cope with an essentially temporary emergency. 
This question takes on even greater significance in view of the fact 
that it is doubtful whether incomes policies can do much more than 
attempt to suppress the results of disequilibria on the labor and product 
markets without affecting the disequilibria themselves. Not too much, 
I suspect, should be made of this argument for the short run since neither 
labor nor most product markets approach the state of perfect markets 
and since administered priées prevail as a resuit of oligopoliste insti-
tutions. But once again: over the long run, the term « suppressed 
inflation » takes on reality, even in imperfect markets and in the présence 
of oligopoly. The distortions produced by concealed inflation are likely 
to become increasingly significant as the time span grows over which 
we consider the phenomenon. 
Moreover, to the dégree that thèse conséquences are not visible 
to the naked eye, the suppression of inflation makes it easier to avoid 
tackling the real problems underlying the process of wage-inflation, 
first among them the lack of elasticity in the supply of labor. Two issues 
in particular must be squarely confronted. 
1. As was stated earlier, trade-offs among various objectives of 
économie policy are unavoidable. One task of économie policy then is 
first of ail to make choices as rational as they can be, by pointing out 
the trade-offs that are possible and necessary. This is based upon 
the — perhaps utopian — belief that rational and consious choices are 
better than incidental and emotional ones. lô 
2. Another major tool-objective of économie policy is that of 
making choices easier by reducing — as it were — the opportunity costs. 
Raising the level of tolerable inflation, for instance, by compensating, 
partly or fully, some of its victims — reducing industrial conflict by 
providing better machinery for its settlement — reducing inflationary 
pressures by increasing productivity or making supply schedules of pro-
duction factors more elastic — facilitating international business under 
fluctuating exchange rates or wider gold points — ail thèse and many 
(19) For this reason as well as others, some degree of price increase has been 
accepted by économie policy-makers in several countries, as for example in die Fifth 
Plan in France, the Report for 1966 of the « Three Wise Men » in Denmark, and 
the 1965 Report of the German Committee of Economie Experts. 
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more may be called upon to assiste in making trade-offs easier to accept. 
The measures required to this end, running from éducation and retraining 
to modifications of union organization, involve much further-reaching 
institutional changes than the term « higher elasticity of labor » would 
lead one to expect. Still, ail in ail, what we would be aiming at is an 
accommodation among compétitive objeotives rather than a clear-cut 
solution of a given problem. 
LA POLITIQUE DES REVENUS : QUELQUES COMMENTAIRES 
L'expérience prouve que la politique des revenus né peut pas être considérée 
comme un des fondements d'un programme anti-inflationiste. Elle n'est tout au 
plus qu'un mécanisme auxiliaire de courte période. 
H y a eu beaucoup de littérature sur le concept d'inflation due à la poussée 
des coûts. Mais, en fait, la motivation à tout ce travail est due d'une part à la 
tendance inflationniste à long terme qui a suivi la seconde grande guerre et d'autre 
part encore plus aux nombreuses crises de balance des paiements qui ont caractérisé 
la conjoncture économique durant cette période de croissance qu'ont constitué 
les deux dernières décades. 
Les questions que l'on peut se poser sur la valeur des théories du « cost push » 
et le manque de clarté quant aux buts poursuivis par une politique des revenus 
rendent encore plus difficile l'évaluation des résultats d'une telle politique. Une 
comparaison entre les programmes américains et français illustre ces difficultés. 
Il serait bon ici d'insister sur les différences entre les diverses politiques de 
revenus : 
a) disons qu'il semble que notre pays soit particulièrement sensible à l'infla-
tion quoique beaucoup moins au chômage comme la plupart des pays 
de l'Europe de l'Ouest ; 
b) la portée de ces politiques peut différer selon qu'elles visent à influencer 
exclusivement les salaires ou les autres revenus ; 
c) les différences observées peuvent aussi être dues à la multiplicité des mé-
thodes d'approche utilisées. 
Résumons les données permettant l'évaluation des diverses politiques de revenu. 
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TABLEAU I 
CHANGEMENTS ANNUELS MOYENS (EN %) DANS LES COÛTS DE TRAVAIL PAR UNITÉ 
DE PRODUCTION DANS L'INDUSTRIE MANUFACTURIERE 
1952-58 1948-65 1952-58 1948*65 
Allemagne O. 1.8 3.2 Irlande 1.9 2.3 
Autriche 0.7 2.7 Italie — 1.8 2.6 
Belgique — 0.4 Norvège 1.4 1.4 
Danemark 2.0 3.9 Royaume Uni 3.6 2.3 
Etats-Unis 1.2 — 0.8 Suède 2.0 2.0 
France 4.5 1.2 Suisse — 2.0 
Hollande 3.2 3.0 
Nous pouvons, à partir de ces chiffres, dégager un certain nombre de con-
clusions : 
a) l'efficacité de la politique des revenus semble s'être atténuée avec le 
temps ; 
b) les restrictions ont perdu de leur efficacité entre la table de négociation 
et l'atelier ; 
c ) l'effet destructeur du « wage drift » sur la politique des revenus est 
quelque peu incertain ; 
d) l'expérience ne démontre pas que les pays avec des politiques de revenus 
ont mieux réussi que les autres. 
Plusieurs politiques de revenus se sont servies de différentes façons de la pro-
ductivité comme unité de mesure dans la détermination des augmentations de 
salaires permises. Supposant l'élimination dans les différences d'utilisation de cette 
mesure, les implications possibles de son utilité ont certaines significations. 
a) La première alternative est celle de l'économie concertée. Mais cela ne 
vaut pas à l'infini. 
b) l'action politique syndicale est une autre alternative. 
La politique des revenus traite d'un des problèmes fondamentaux d'une société 
de plein emploi, à savoir sa tendance inflationiste interne. 
Après considération des diverses expériences à travers le monde, il reste que 
le principal problème de ce moyen d'enrayer l'inflation dans une économie de plein 
emploi est celui de la longue période. Cette difficulté n'a pas encore été surmon-
tée et la tendance à considérer la politique des revenus dans une perspective de 
courte période a plutôt été défavorable à la découverte d'une solution. 
Elaborons quelque peu : 
a) il y a eu, dans le domaine des restrictions de salaires et de prix, un 
divorce entre l'idéologie et l'action ; 
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b) les politiques de revenus représentent un retour aux méthodes dirigistes 
des années *30 ; 
c) on ignore l'effet en longue période de la politique des revenus sur la 
productivité 
Il semble donc que nous avons traditionnellement considéré notre société de 
plein emploi de longue période simplement comme une société traditionnelle 
exempte de chômage substantiel à long terme. Nous constatons de plus en plus 
que l'absence d'emploi substantiel de longue période peut affecter certaines des 
bases de nos institutions. Il n'est aucune institution sacrée et même en l'absence 
d'une politique de revenus l'existence du plein emploi de longue période a radi-
calement changé l'attitude des syndicats et des employeurs. 
SOCIALISATION ET RELATIONS INDUSTRIELLES 
La socialisation : caractère et signification ( GERARD DION ). L'entreprise 
privée face à la socialisation (RAYMOND GERIN). Le syndicalisme en con-
texte socialisée : fonctions et responsabilités nouvelles (LOUIS-MARIE 
TREMBLAY). Le rôle de l'Etat en relations du travail - essai de réévalua-
tion (JEAN-REAL CARDIN). VEtat-employeur et la fonction publique 
(SJ. FRANKEL). Discussion (ALBERT GINGRAS, YVON CHARTRAND, 
MICHEL HARRISON). La négociation collective dans les secteurs privés 
subventionnés par l'Etat. Point de vue patronal (PAUL DESROCHERS). 
Point de vue syndical (JACQUES ARCHAMBAULT). Discussion (GILLES 
GAUDREAULT, LEOPOLD GARANT, J.-R. GAUTHIER). Planification, 
entreprise privée et syndicalisme libre (PAUL NORMANDÉAU). 
1 volume, 188 pages — Prix: $3.00 
LES PRESSES DE L'UNIVERSITE LAVAL 
Case Postale 2447 Québec 2 Tél . : 656-2131 
